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 Abstract— In this paper we consider the development of 
algorithms for the automatic detection of buried threats using 
ground penetrating radar (GPR) measurements.  GPR is one of 
the most studied and successful modalities for automatic buried 
threat detection (BTD), and a large variety of BTD algorithms 
have been proposed for it.  Despite this, large-scale comparisons of 
GPR-based BTD algorithms are rare in the literature.  In this 
work we report the results of a multi-institutional effort to develop 
advanced buried threat detection algorithms for a real-world GPR 
BTD system.  The effort involved five institutions with substantial 
experience with the development of GPR-based BTD algorithms. 
In this paper we report the technical details of the advanced 
algorithms submitted by each institution, representing their latest 
technical advances, and many state-of-the-art GPR-based BTD 
algorithms.  We also report the results of evaluating the algorithms 
from each institution on the large experimental dataset used for 
development. The experimental dataset comprised 120,000 𝒎𝟐 of 
GPR data using surface area, from 13 different lanes across two 
US test sites.  The data was collected using a vehicle-mounted GPR 
system, the variants of which have supplied data for numerous 
publications.  Using these results, we identify the most successful 
and common processing strategies among the submitted 
algorithms, and make recommendations for GPR-based BTD 
algorithm design.   
 
Index Terms—ground penetrating radar, landmine detection, 
buried threat detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we consider the development of algorithms for 
the automatic detection of buried threats in ground penetrating 
radar (GPR) data.  GPR is one of the most well studied and 
successful modalities for buried threat detection (BTD), and a 
large variety of BTD algorithms have been proposed in the 
literature for GPR-based BTD [1]–[18]. For example, GPR-
based BTD algorithms have employed techniques from fields 
as varied as statistics [19]–[21], computer vision [22]–[24], and 
machine learning [6], [25]–[27].   
Prolific development within the research community has 
advanced the effectiveness of GPR-based BTD systems, 
however most modern studies focus on proposing new 
algorithms, and they often compare their results against just one 
or two other algorithms [2], [22], [23], [28]–[31].  Systematic 
comparisons of modern algorithms are rare, and therefore it can 
be difficult to discern which algorithms, and more generally 
which processing practices, are best.   
A. A multi-institutional comparison of algorithms 
In this work we report the results of a recent multi-
institutional effort to develop, and compare, advanced buried 
threat detection algorithms. The effort involved five institutions 
with substantial GPR-based BTD experience: Duke University, 
University of Louisville, University of Missouri, University of 
Florida, and Chemring Sensors and Electronic Systems (CSES).  
A major objective of this effort was to identify the best 
processing approaches, and evaluate them in an unbiased 
manner, for potential inclusion in a real-world BTD system.  As 
a result, each institution was provided with the same period of 
time for algorithm development; the same experimental dataset; 
and advanced knowledge of the scoring criteria.   
The institutions were specifically tasked with developing 
discriminators.  Discriminators must accept a small cube of 
GPR data (e.g., centered at a suspicious spatial “alarm” 
location), and return a decision statistic. The decision statistic 
indicates the relative likelihood that a buried threat is located at 
that location.  An example cube of GPR data is shown in Fig. 1.  
The discriminators produced in this effort were compared using 
a large GPR dataset collected using a vehicle-mounted GPR-
based BTD system, the variants of which have been involved in 
numerous publications over the preceding years [18], [23], [25], 
[32]–[36].  The GPR dataset collected using this system, and 
used to compare the discriminators, was comprised of 120,000 
m2 of surface area, collected over 13 lanes at two different US 
test sites, and encompassing 4,552 buried threat encounters.   
 
B. Contributions of this work 
The first major contribution of this work is a technical 
description of the discrimination algorithms submitted by each 
institution. While some algorithms represent the latest advances 
to previously proposed GPR-based BTD discriminators (e.g., 
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Fig. 1: Illustration of a cube of GPR data of the kind considered in this work.  
A slice of the data (i.e., an image) indicated by the solid line is projected onto 
Spatial axis 1, and the slice of data indicated by the dashed line is projected 
onto Spatial axis 2, for visualization of the contents of the GPR cube.  
Discrimination algorithms must distinguish between data cubes corresponding 
to threats and non-threats. This particular example corresponds to data collected 
at the location of a buried threat.   
 gprHOG, EHD, LG), others are novel GPR-based BTD 
discriminators (e.g., SED).  In either case, these algorithms 
incorporate the latest technical advances from each institution, 
and therefore represent state-of-the-art algorithms within the 
GPR-based BTD community.    
The second major contribution of this work is a presentation 
and analysis of the results of the algorithm performance 
comparison. Notably, we compare and contrast the 
discrimination algorithms in order to distill the underlying 
processing strategies that are most effective for GPR-based 
BTD.  Based upon these analyses we make recommendations 
for the design of effective BTD algorithms. 
Our final contribution is comprised of two additional analyses 
of the results.  The first analysis involved a rudimentary fusion 
of the algorithms, which yielded performance improvements.  
This result suggests that the discrimination algorithms provide 
complementary detection capabilities.  Additional analysis also 
reveals relative advantages of some algorithms on shallow and 
deeply buried threats, respectively.  
C. Paper organization  
Section II describes the GPR system used to collect data for 
this study, and provides details regarding the experimental 
dataset.  In Section III we discuss the experimental design that 
was used to evaluate the discriminators: the full detection 
processing pipeline for the GPR BTD system, data handling 
(e.g., how the data was used for training and testing supervised 
algorithms), and the scoring criteria.  Section IV describes the 
technical details of the prescreening algorithm, which identifies 
suspicious locations for processing by the discrimination 
algorithms.  Section V presents the technical details of the four 
discrimination algorithms submitted for the algorithm 
comparison.  Section VI presents the experimental results.  
Section VII presents an analysis of the results, including fusion 
of the discriminator outputs, and a breakdown of their 
performance by target burial depth.  Section VIII presents our 
conclusions, and recommendations for the design of effective 
GPR-based BTD algorithms. 
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL SENSOR AND DATASET  
In this section, we describe the vehicle-mounted radar system 
that was used to collect the GPR data used in our experiments, 
as well the GPR dataset that was collected using this system.   
A. The vehicle-mounted radar system  
The radar system employed to collect GPR data is comprised 
of an array of radar antennas that are mounted on the front of a 
vehicle.  The array is oriented perpendicular to the direction of 
travel (i.e., cross-track), and the antennas are equally spaced 
along the array.  During data collection, each antenna emits an 
ultra-wideband radar signal, consisting of a differentiated 
Gaussian pulse, and then measures the energy reflected back 
towards the array from the subsurface. The result of this 
procedure is a time-series of signal strengths, known as an A-
scan [12], [23], from each antenna.  As the vehicle moves 
forward down a path or lane, referred to as the “down-track” 
direction, each antenna records A-scans at regular down-track 
(spatial) intervals.  The recording of cross-track A-scans (across 
the array), and down-track A-scans (along the direction of 
travel) results in a volume of GPR data.  An example of a large 
GPR data volume is illustrated in Fig. 2.   
B. GPR dataset details 
The data in this experiment was collected at two distinct US 
testing sites, designated “Site A” and “Site B”.  A series of 
testing lanes (or pathways) were constructed at each site.  A 
mixture of government manufactured and improvised threats 
were buried at known locations throughout each lane in order 
to evaluate the detection capabilities of the BTD system.  The 
objects were buried at various depths, and contain varying 
levels of metal content.  The burial depths and metal content of 
the target population is summarized in Table 1.   
Site A was located in a temperate geographic location, and 
was comprised of 449 unique threats, distributed over 7 lanes.  
56 total runs (or passes) were made over the lanes at Site A, 
resulting in a total of 48,000 m2 of scanned lane area, and 3,368 
threat encounters.  Site B was located at an arid geographic 
location, and was comprised of 210 unique threats, distributed 
over 6 lanes.  34 total passes were made over the lanes, resulting 
in a total of roughly 72,000 m2 of scanned lane area, and 1,184 
threat encounters.  In total, the testing data consisted of 90 runs 
over 13 unique lanes, encompassing roughly 120,000 m2 of 
lane area.   
 
Table 1: Metal content and burial depth of the experimental threat (encounter) 
population.  The precise depth ranges for each burial depth category have 
been omitted to obscure the precise performance characteristics of the 
proprietary GPR-based BTD system.  Here the “Deep burial depths” category 
corresponds to threats that are buried at (roughly) the 90th percentile burial 
depth, or deeper.  
 Metal 
Low 
metal 
Non-
metal 
Total 
Standard  burial depths 1441 2121 465 4027 
Deep burial depths 308 0 217 525 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In this section we present details of the experimental design 
employed in this study to evaluate and compare the 
performance of the discrimination algorithms submitted by 
each institution.  Importantly, this section also lays out the 
design specifications and/or constraints for the algorithms that 
were provided to each institution during development.  
A. The two-stage detection processing pipeline  
The full detection algorithm, or processing pipeline, 
employed on our BTD system is comprised of two sub-
processes: prescreening and discrimination (i.e., 
classification).  This processing pipeline is illustrated and 
described in Fig. 2, and has been applied in numerous previous 
studies that considered GPR-based BTD [1], [18], [23], [37]–
[39].  The prescreener employed in our experiments was 
developed by the CSES Corporation, while the discrimination 
algorithms were developed by at least one of the other 
institutions (all of which are University research groups). 
As discussed in Fig. 2, each discrimination algorithm must 
accept a cube of GPR data as its input, and return a real number 
indicating the relative likelihood that the location under 
consideration contains a buried threat.  These cubes are 
centered at suspicious spatial locations, called alarms,  that are 
 identified by the prescreener.  The cube of GPR data has a 
predetermined spatial extent, imposed by the need to process 
the data in real-time during system operation.  Similarly, the 
radar system collects A-scans of a pre-determined, and fixed, 
(temporal) length.  All algorithms were required to operate 
within these constraints.   
 
B. Data handling: discriminator training and testing 
All of the discriminators submitted for this comparison 
contain some type of supervised statistical, or machine learning, 
model. Supervised models have parameters that must be 
inferred using labeled examples of the classes of data we wish 
to categorize (e.g., threats and non-threats in this case).  This 
process of parameter inference is often referred to as training, 
and it results in a trained algorithm that can then be applied to 
new, unlabeled, data in order to infer whether it is a threat or 
not (i.e., threat inference).  Supervised learning models obtain 
excellent performance when sufficient training data is 
available, and they have now become popular in the GPR BTD 
literature [2], [18], [25], [38], [40], [41].  
A common approach to assess the performance of any 
supervised algorithm (i.e., an algorithm containing a supervised 
model), is to employ cross-validation. This process involves 
training the models on some subset of the data, and then 
evaluating their ability to discriminate between the desired data 
classes on data that was excluded from training.  In this work 
the discrimination algorithms were evaluated using a lane-
based cross-validation approach, which we illustrate and 
describe in Fig. 3.   
C. Scoring the algorithms 
The output of the discriminators (and prescreener) is a list of 
spatial alarm locations and their associated decision statistics.  
Before scoring these alarms, we must establish which of them 
should be considered correct alarms (i.e., they occur over real 
threats), and which of them are false alarms.  In this work, any 
alarm located within a radius of 0.25m of a buried threat was 
considered to be a correct alarm, while all other alarms were 
considered false. This is a popular criterion that has been 
employed in numerous previous GPR-based BTD studies [30], 
[33], [42]–[45].   
Given the true identity of each alarm (threat or non-threat), 
we can score the performance of the discriminators, and the 
prescreener. In this work we employ receiver operating 
characteristic (ROC) curves to measure performance.  ROC 
curves quantify the tradeoff between the correct alarm rate (or 
probability of detection), 𝑃𝑑, and the false alarm rate (or 
probability of false detection), 𝐹𝐴𝑅, as we vary the sensitivity 
of the algorithm.  The ROC curve is a popular metric in the GPR 
BTD literature [1], [6], [18], [23], [39], [46], where it is 
common to scale the FAR metric so that it corresponds to the 
number of false alarms per square meter of scanned surface 
area.  This representation of the BTD system’s FAR is often 
more interpretable and operationally relevant than false alarm 
probabilities.  Unless otherwise stated, any reference to FAR in 
this work refers to false alarms per square meter.  
The vehicle-mounted BTD system considered in this work is 
proprietary, and therefore it was necessary to obscure its precise 
performance capabilities.  In order to meet this need, while still 
effectively comparing the algorithms, we omitted all of the FAR 
values from the ROC curves reported in this work (i.e., the 
values on the x-axis are omitted).  Although FARs were 
omitted, all of the ROC curves in this work (except Fig. 10 
involving the prescreener) use exactly the same range of FAR 
values on the x-axis.  The presented range of FAR values 
corresponds to those FARs that were considered most 
operationally relevant for the discrimination algorithms. 
Consequently, the algorithm designers were tasked with 
developing discrimination algorithms to achieve the highest 
possible 𝑃𝑑 over this FAR range.   
 
 
Fig. 2: Illustration of the two-stage detection processing approach employed in 
the BTD system in this study.  (a) The first stage of processing is 
“prescreening”, in which a relatively fast algorithm (a prescreener) is applied 
to the raw incoming volume of GPR data to identify a small set of suspicious 
locations, called alarms, for processing by the more computationally intensive 
discrimination algorithms. The prescreening operation reduces the amount of 
data considerably, making it possible to apply the discrimination algorithms in 
real-time (e.g., on a moving vehicle).  (b) In the second stage of processing, 
discrimination algorithms are applied to cubes of GPR data extracted at each 
alarm location identified by the prescreener.  The goal of the discrimination 
algorithm is to assign a “decision statistic” to each alarm location indicating the 
relative likelihood that the data corresponds to a true buried threat.  Note that 
the discriminators operate only on the locations identified by the prescreener, 
and therefore any buried threats that are missed by the prescreener cannot be 
identified by the discriminators.   
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Illustration of the lane-based cross-validation procedure used to evaluate 
the discrimination algorithms.  Training of the supervised portions of the 
discrimination algorithms (i.e., parameter inference) is performed on 
prescreener alarms from 𝑁 − 1 lanes. This process yields a trained 
discrimination algorithm that can be deployed for threat inference on new, 
previously unseen, GPR data.  The trained algorithm is applied for threat 
inference on prescreener alarms on the remaining lane that was withheld from 
training.  This yields a list of decision statistics, indicating the relative 
likelihood that each of the prescreener alarms corresponds to a true buried 
threat.  This process is performed 𝑁 times, so that each lane is employed exactly 
once for threat inference.  The decision statistics from each lane are then 
aggregated and used to compute performance metrics for the algorithm.  
  
 IV. THE PRESCREENING ALGORITHM 
In this section we describe the prescreener algorithm, which 
is comprised of a fusion two individual prescreeners: the F2 
prescreener, and the CCY prescreener.  Each prescreener 
operates independently, and then their outputs are fused.  First, 
we describe the two prescreeners, followed by the technique for 
fusing their outputs.  
Note that, prior to prescreening, preprocessing is applied in 
which the time of the ground response is estimated at each 
spatial location, and then each A-scan is shifted so that the 
ground response occurs at the same time index across all spatial 
locations.  Subsequently all data at, or above, the ground 
response is removed.  These two preprocessing steps are 
common in GPR BTD [21], [29], [47], [48].   
A. The F2 prescreener 
The F2 pre-screener is an updated version of F1 (Fast One) 
which in turn was derived from a LMS-based pre-screener 
developed by [42] to reduce its run time while maintaining 
comparable performance. The overall strategy of F2 is to 
identify locations in the GPR data with high signal energy, 
relative to the surrounding data.  This strategy is implemented 
through a series of smoothing and constant false alarm rate 
(CFAR) processing [21], [49]. In this context, CFAR filtering 
usually refers to a process of statistically whitening data with a 
locally computed mean and standard deviation.  With this in 
mind, F2 involves the following major processing steps: 
(1) At each time index, median filtering the GPR volume in 
the down-track direction, to mitigate noise. 
(2) At each time index, subtraction of the mean in the cross-
track dimension, in order to remove panel-specific signal 
variations.  
(3) Depth binning, whereby each A-scan is divided into non-
overlapping bins (i.e., subsets of time indices).  The set of 
A-scan values within each bin is replaced by the average 
of the top two values within that bin.   
(4) CFAR filtering is applied along the time axis.  
(5) The processed GPR volume is summed along the time 
axis, resulting in a single value at each spatial location 
(i.e., a 2-dimensional spatial map of intensities).  
(6) 2-dimensional CFAR and Gaussian smoothing operations 
are applied, in that order, to the spatial map.  
Alarms are obtained from the processed spatial map by 
applying thresholding to the resulting intensity values, and 
identifying connected components of pixels with intensities 
above the threshold. 
B. The CCY prescreener 
To provide prescreening information complementary to that 
provided by F2 CSES developed a shape-based prescreener 
called Concavity (CCY).  Given that the signal returns from real 
buried threats manifest as hyperbolas in the GPR data, the 
estimated convexity or concavity of signals in the data serve as 
a useful metric for identifying threats.  This insight forms the 
basis for the CCY prescreener.  
The CCY prescreener implementation begins by statistically 
whitening each point in the GPR volume based upon statistics 
computed on neighboring points at the same depth (time index).  
This step mitigates signal attenuation with respect to depth.  
Once this preprocessing is completed, a concavity measurement 
is computed at every spatial location in the GPR volume.  This 
concavity measurement is itself computed from two concavity 
measurements: one computed on a down-track slice of GPR 
data, and one computed on a cross-track slice of GPR data.   
Given either slice of GPR data, the concavity calculation 
proceeds in the same manner, and produces two concavity 
measures, 𝑐+ and 𝑐− that are summed to obtain one concavity 
measure for the slice.  A detailed description of the algorithm 
used to compute 𝑐+ and 𝑐− is presented in Table 2, but we 
outline the algorithm here.  The algorithm attempts to identify 
sequences of high magnitude pixels that form a concave curve.  
This search proceeds by considering the positive signals and the 
negative signals separately.  For example, we consider only the 
positive signal by setting all of the negative pixel values to zero, 
and then identifying local maxima in the resulting image that 
exceed some value threshold. This processing is illustrated on 
real GPR data in Fig. 4 (middle image).  𝑐+ is a measure of the 
concavity of the sequence of local maxima identified in the 
image.  A similar process is applied to identify the negative 
signals to obtain 𝑐−.  The negative image maxima are also 
illustrated in Fig. 4.   
The final estimate of concavity at a particular spatial location 
consists of summing the two concavity measures from the 
down-track slice (i.e., 𝑐+ and  𝑐−) with those from the cross-
track slice (i.e., four total).  Once a concavity measure is 
computed for every spatial location, a smoothing filter is 
applied to the resulting 2-dimensional map of concavity values.  
The CCY pre-screener reports as alarms the maximum points 
from 9x9 windows that are above a predetermined threshold. 
 
C. Fusion of the prescreeners 
Due to the complementary nature of the F2 (energy-focused) 
and CCY (shape-focused) prescreeners, it has been 
advantageous to prescreening performance to fuse their 
respective outputs.  This can be accomplished by treating the 
alarms made by F2 and CCY as though they were generated 
from a single prescreener. However, it is likely that many pairs 
of alarms (i.e., one from F2 and one from CCY) will correspond 
to the same object (e.g., buried threat, subsurface rocks, roots, 
etc). This may result in wasteful processing of the same object 
via several different alarms, and create unnecessary vehicle 
stops or slowdowns if the object is perceived as a threat.   
To address this problem, we merge alarms that are likely to 
be redundant. A simple and effective proxy for alarm 
redundancy is the relative proximity of the two alarms, and so 
alarms are merged using a proximity threshold.  The exact 
details of the merging process are omitted here due to space 
considerations.  In the event of a merger, however, the two 
 
Fig. 4: (left) Illustration of a GPR slice.  (middle) The sequences of local 
maxima values (in red) that were identified for computing 𝑐+.  This sequence 
was identified within the black dashed box in the GPR slice.  The full 
procedure for identifying such sequences, and computing 𝑐+, are described in 
Table 2.  The sequences of local minima values (in blue) that were identified 
for computing 𝑐−.   
  
 alarms are usually replaced with a single alarm, and the decision 
statistic assigned to the new alarm is given by a weighted sum 
(i.e., an average) of the statistics from the individual alarms.  
In general, the F2 and CCY decision statistics can differ by 
orders of magnitude, potentially interfering with the 
effectiveness of the weighted average, because the magnitude 
of one prescreener statistic dominates the other.  To mitigate 
this problem, the CCY statistics are re-scaled as follows: 
a*CCYb+c. In our experiments the three parameters, a, b, and 
c, were determined using training data to maximize the area 
under the ROC curve on the training data.   
 
V. DISCRIMINATION ALGORITHMS 
This section presents the technical details of each of the 
discrimination algorithms submitted for the comparison.  
Although it was not a design constraint, all of the submitted 
discriminators follow the same basic processing pipeline, 
involving feature extraction and classification.  This pipeline is 
illustrated and described in Fig. 5.  For simplicity, we will refer 
to each discriminator by its feature extraction approach.  For 
example, the first algorithm is based on the edge histogram 
descriptor (EHD) feature and we will therefore refer to it as “the 
EHD algorithm”.  Using the aforementioned nomenclature, a 
total of four discriminators were submitted for the comparison: 
EHD, Log-Gabor (LG), the Histogram of Oriented Gradients 
for GPR (gprHOG), and Spatial Edge Descriptors (SED).  The 
description of each algorithm is broken down into three parts: 
feature extraction, classifier and training, and threat inference 
(i.e., how predictions are made on new data).   
As described in Section III, all of these discriminators were 
required to operate on 3-Dimensional cubes of GPR data.  All 
of the discriminators apply two initial pre-processing steps: (i) 
alignment of all A-scans so that the ground response in each A-
scan occurs at the same time (depth) index; and (ii) the removal 
of all GPR data at, and above, the ground time index.  LG only 
applies (i) for preprocessing.  
All of the discriminators submitted to the comparison apply 
some form of depth-based calibration of the data. Although the 
precise approaches varied slightly, this calibration procedure 
always consisted of normalizing, or whitening, each pixel by 
removing a locally computed mean from the data, and dividing 
by a locally computed standard deviation.  For example, at a 
given time index (depth), the mean and variance can be 
computed using a set of leading and trailing GPR samples, and 
subsequently used for whitening all pixels at that time index.  
   
A. Edge Histogram Descriptors (EHD) 
The EHD uses translation invariant features that are based on 
the histogram of edges in the GPR signature [32]. It is an 
adaptation of the MPEG-7 EHD feature [50] which encodes 
image texture information. It has been adapted to capture the 
spatial distribution of the edges within a 3D GPR volume. To 
keep the computation simple, 2D edge operators are used, and 
two types of edge histograms are computed. The first one, 
called EHDDT, is obtained by fixing the cross-track dimension 
and extracting edges in the (time, down-track) plane. The 
second edge histogram, called EHDCT, is obtained by fixing the 
down-track dimension and extracting edges in the (time, cross-
track) plane. 
Feature extraction: The EHDDT and EHDCT features are 
extracted from a GPR volume located at the prescreener alarm 
location with sizes (T,XT,DT) = (60, 15, 15). Let S(t,x,y) 
denote this volume, and let 𝑆𝑡𝑦
(𝑥)
denote the xth plane of S. First, 
for each 𝑆𝑡𝑦
(𝑥)
, four categories of edges are computed using 3x3 
Sobel filters: vertical, horizontal, 45o diagonal, and 135o anti-
diagonal. If the maximum of the edge strengths exceeds a preset 
threshold, the corresponding pixel is considered to be an edge 
pixel and is labeled according to the direction of the maximum 
edge. Otherwise, it is considered a non-edge pixel. Next, each 
𝑆𝑡𝑦
(𝑥)
 image is vertically subdivided into 7 overlapping sub-
images 𝑆𝑡𝑦,𝑖
(𝑥)
, 𝑖 = 1, … , 7. For each 𝑆𝑡𝑦,𝑖
(𝑥)
, a 5 bin edge histogram, 
𝐻𝑡𝑦,𝑖
(𝑥)
, is computed. The bins correspond to the 4-edge categories 
and the non-edge pixels. The EHDDT is defined as the 
concatenation of the 7 five-bin histograms. That is, 
TABLE 2 
Algorithm to compute concavity measures, 𝑐+and 𝑐− 
Input: A GPR slice, 𝑆(𝑡, 𝑧), where 𝑡 is the temporal axis and 𝑧 is 
the spatial dimension. Denote the spatial center of the patch by 𝑧0.  
Parameters:  
𝜔 = Size of the search window for maxima (positive integer) 
𝛾 = The threshold to retain maxima values 
Output: Two concavity measures, 𝑐+ and 𝑐− 
1. Compute 𝑆′(𝑡, 𝑧) = |max( 𝑆(𝑡, 𝑧), 0)|  ∀(𝑡, 𝑧) 
2. Compute 𝑡∗ = max
𝑖
𝑆′(𝑖, 𝑧0)   
3. If 𝑆′(𝑡∗, 𝑧0) ≥ 𝛾 set 𝑐
+ = 0 and go to step (9), else,  initialize 
the set of coordinates Χ = {(𝑡∗, 𝑧0)} 
4. For 𝑗 = 1 … 5 
(a) Set 𝑖∗ = argmin
𝑖∈[−𝜔,𝜔]
 |𝑡∗ − 𝑖| 𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑆′(𝑡∗ + 𝑖, 𝑧0 + 𝑗) ≥ 𝛾   
(b) If no 𝑖∗ = ∅, go to step (5),  
  else add (𝑡∗ + 𝑖∗, 𝑧0 + 𝑗) to Χ and set 𝑡
∗ = 𝑡∗ + 𝑖∗ 
End 
5. Repeat step (4), with 𝑗 = −1 … − 5.  The set 𝐶 now contains a 
sequence of (spatially) neighboring points, with a maximum 
potential length of 11 points.  See Fig. 4 for examples on real data.  
6. Construct Χ′ as the set of all possible sequences of consecutive 
points that can be constructed from the points in X. 
7. 𝑐+ = 1/|𝑋′|  ∑ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑥∈𝐶′ , where f(.) is a function that 
measures concavity as the difference between a sequence’s mid-
point and the average of its end-points.   
8. Set 𝑆 =  −𝑆 and repeat steps (1)-(7) to obtain 𝑐− 
 
 
Fig. 5: Although not a design constraint, each discrimination algorithm 
submitted for the algorithm comparison adopted the same processing pipeline, 
illustrated here.  (a) Feature extraction is the first step of processing, and 
consists of extracting of measures or statistics from the GPR data, with the aim 
of concisely (e.g., in a low dimensional vector) summarizing the important 
characteristics of the data.  For example, many features attempt to encode the 
strength and orientation of edges in GPR slices.  (b) The features extracted in 
(a) are provided to a supervised classification model that has been trained to 
distinguish between features corresponding to threats and non-threats, 
respectively.  The classifiers assign a decision statistic to the input feature, 
indicating the relative likelihood that it corresponds to a threat.   
  
 𝐸𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇(𝑆(𝑡, 𝑥, 𝑦)) = [𝐻𝑡𝑦,1 … 𝐻𝑡𝑦,7], where 𝐻𝑡𝑦,𝑖 is the 
cross-track average of the edge histograms of sub-images 𝑆𝑡𝑦
(𝑥)
 
over the 7 middle channels, i.e., 𝐻𝑡𝑦,𝑖 =
1
7
∑ 𝐻𝑡𝑦,𝑖
(𝑥)11
𝑥=5 . To 
compute the EHD output in the cross-track direction, i.e., 
EHDCT, the y plane of S(t,x,y) is fixed and edges are extracted 
from 𝑆𝑡𝑥
(𝑦)
 in a similar  way. 
Classifier and training: Support Vector Machine (SVM) [51] 
classifiers, with the radial basis function, were used for class 
prediction. One SVM for the EHDDT features (SVMDT) is 
trained and a second SVM for the EHDCT (SVMCT) is also 
trained. Both classifiers were implemented using the libSVM 
package [52]. All parameters were set to their default values.  
At each spatial location indicated by the prescreener, EHDDT 
and EHDCT features are extracted at multiple depths down the 
temporal axis by sampling one S(t,x,y) every 25 temporal 
indices. That is, we extract features from S(t=1..60, x, y), 
S(t=25..84,x, y), ... . This results in a total of 14 EHD features, 
fi, i=1,…,14,  per spatial location identified by the prescreener. 
For non-target alarms, any of the 14 features could be included 
in the training data. To maintain a balance between the number 
of training samples from both classes, we randomly select 5 of 
the 14 features. For targets, we use a kernel density estimator 
(KDE) to identify the few features that correspond to the most 
likely temporal location of the buried threat signal. Let 𝑃− =
{𝑝1
−, 𝑝2
−, … 𝑝𝑘
−} be a set of k prototypes that summarize all of the 
non-target training alarms. Then, for each target training alarm, 
we estimate the KDE of its 14 EHD feature using  
𝐾𝐷𝐸(𝑓𝑖) =
1
𝑍
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛽‖𝑓𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗
−‖)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 (1) 
where  is a resolution parameter (learned during 
summarization of the non-target training alarms) and Z is a 
normalization factor. The 𝑓𝑖 features with very low KDE (close 
to zero) are selected as the most likely temporal locations that 
correspond to the actual target signatures and will be used for 
training. 
Threat inference: For threat inference on new data, 14 𝐸𝐻𝐷𝐷𝑇  
features and 14 EHDCT features are extracted from each 
prescreener alarm at multiple temporal locations. Then, the 
trained SVMDT and SVMCT classifiers are used to assign 
confidence values to each EHDDT and EHDCT feature 
respectively. Next, we fuse the decision statistics from both 
directions by taking their geometric mean at each temporal 
location. The final decision statistic is computed by summing 
the 3 top fused values. 
B. Log-Gabor (LG) 
The Gabor filter, which is essentially a modulated Gaussian 
function at some frequency fo, has been useful for many filtering 
tasks in signal processing.  The Gabor filter bank is a series of 
Gabor filters created by imposing the constraint that the 
standard deviation governing the spread of the Gaussian 
function is inversely proportional to the modulation frequency 
𝑓0. Allowing the modulation frequency to increase in a dyadic 
manner creates the Gabor wavelets that are common for time-
frequency signal analysis [53].  A distinct property of the Gabor 
filter is that its Fourier transform follows a Gaussian shape as 
well. Thereby the Gabor wavelets define a filter bank with each 
bandpass filter having a Gaussian shape frequency response. 
In the processing of GPR data, the frequency spectrum of the 
radar echo reflected by a threat is asymmetric and has a long 
tail towards the high frequency region.  To better capture the 
characteristics of the threat signal to aid detection, we apply the 
log-Gabor wavelets instead.  The log-Gabor filter was first 
proposed by Field [54] in 1987 for image processing to better 
preserve the edge behavior in a natural image.  The log-Gabor 
filter has a Gaussian frequency response in the log-frequency 
axis, thereby having a long tail response in frequency.  Fig. 1 
illustrates the difference in frequency responses between the 
Gabor and the log-Gabor filter. 
 
Feature extraction: As noted previously, the threat signature 
often appears with a hyperbolic pattern in the B-scan.  To 
capture the frequency as well as spatial responses, we shall 
apply the log-Gabor filters in 2-D for extracting the features for 
threat detection.[55] The 2-D log-Gabor filter is defined in the 
frequency domain through the polar coordinates.  Let  be the 
radius from the center and  the angle from the x-axis.  The 
frequency response of the log-Gabor filter response is given by  
𝐺𝐿(𝜌, 𝜃) = 
exp (−
1
2[log(𝜎𝜌)]
2 [𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜌
𝜌0
)]
2
) exp (−
1
2𝜎𝜃
2 (𝜃 − 𝜃𝑜)
2). (2) 
The parameters o and o control the location and the 
orientation of the filter response, and  and  determine the 
spreads in the frequency and angle. We create a set of 36 filters 
to represent the log-Gabor curvelets, by using 4 values of o 
that decompose the frequency range and 9 values of o that 
provide an angle resolution of 20 degrees.  These 36 log-Gabor 
filters cover the frequency plane of a threat’s GPR signal with 
4 different filters at each of the 9 orientations.  Fig. 7 shows the 
frequency as well as the spatial responses of the filters.  The left 
part of the filters extract the rising edge behavior in the B-scan, 
the right part the trailing edge and the middle portion the 
horizontal. 
The B-scan at the prescreener alarm location is separated into 
three spatial regions, with overlap: the left, middle and right.  
The left part of the image is processed by the filters in the first 
three columns in Fig. 7, the right part by the filters in columns 
6 to 8 and the middle part by the filters in columns 4, 5 and 9.  
The filtering process is performed in the frequency domain. 
Each filter output is separated into 15 depth bins with 50% 
overlap. The element of the feature vector is the maximum of 
the energies over the 15 depth bins of each log-Gabor filter 
output. 
In addition to applying the filters to the B-scan in the down-
track, we also apply the log-Gabor filters to the 2-D image 
 
Fig. 6: Frequency response of the Gabor and the log-Gabor filter 
  
 
 collected over the cross-track, as well as those from the 
positive-diagonal and anti-diagonal in the 3-D data cube at the 
alarm location.  Each 2-D image results in 36 features. Since 
there are 4 total images, this yields a final feature vector of 144 
total feature values.  
 
Classifier and training: The feature vectors are used to train 
two SVM classifiers with an RBF kernel to perform target vs 
non-target classification.  The first SVM is trained on the 
feature vector associated with each alarm.  The second SVM is 
trained on a transformation of the feature vector.  Before the 
max-operation is performed depth-wise, each alarm is 
represented by a matrix of feature vectors of dimension 15 ×
144.  The feature matrix is sorted in descending order of 
magnitude and the top 4 rows are used as individual feature 
vectors with the same label as that of the corresponding alarm.  
To avoid overtraining either SVM, a subset of the data is used 
for training.  For the dataset of feature vectors for each SVM, 
the feature vectors of deeply buried threats are replicated once 
(because there are fewer deeply buried threats).  Second, only 
5% of the resulting samples are selected randomly to train the 
SVM classifier. 
Threat inference: For threat inference, each SVM is applied 
to the feature vector transformation that corresponds to the data 
on which it was trained.  Thus, the first SVM is tested on the 
feature vector that is the maximum value depth-wise for each 
of the 144 features for that alarm.  The second SVM is tested 
on each of the 15 feature vectors for an alarm, resulting in 15 
output confidences.  The output confidences are sorted and the 
sum of the top 3 confidences is the final confidence for this 
classifier.  The final confidence is the sum of the confidences 
of the two SVM classifiers. 
C. gprHOG: histogram of oriented gradients for GPR 
Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) is an image 
descriptor that was originally developed in the computer vision 
literature [56].  HOG was first applied for GPR-based BTD in 
[23] and has since become a very popular feature in the 
literature for BTD [2], [7], [28], [33], [57], [58].  Here we 
employ gprHOG, which incorporates several improvements to 
the original HOG implementation for GPR-based BTD in [23]. 
Further details and experimental justification for gprHOG can 
be found in the original paper [59].  
Feature extraction:  Before feature extraction, the data is 
downsampled in the temporal axis by a factor of 2, in 
accordance with [23] (although our numbers are slightly 
different due to differences in the radar system).  The gprHOG 
feature is extracted on a cube of the pre-processed GPR data, 
denoted S(t,x,y), that is [T,XT,DT]=[18,18,18] in size. Similar 
to [23], we extract two gprHOG features: one cross-track 
feature, denoted 𝐻𝑡𝑥, and one down-track feature, denoted 𝐻𝑡𝑦.  
In [23], a single down-track B-scan was used to compute 𝐻𝑡𝑥 
and 𝐻𝑡𝑦, respectively. With gprHOG however, 𝐻𝑡𝑥 is an 
average of features computed over several neighboring cross-
track B-scans, as illustrated in Fig. 8.  This averaging step 
reduces noise in the feature and improves performance. Another 
important modification of HOG is the removal of the histogram 
(or block) normalization step. It was demonstrated in [33] that 
this substantially improves the effectiveness of the HOG 
descriptor for GPR-based BTD.   
Classifier and training:  In order to create a training dataset, 
we extract four image patches at threat locations using the 
MSEK algorithm [38].  MSEK identifies locations along GPR 
time axis that exhibit high levels of signal energy.  At non-threat 
locations, 24 patches are extracted at regular intervals along the 
time axis. gprHOG features are extracted on all of the 
aforementioned patches and used for training.  Another 
important improvement of the gprHOG algorithm (compared to 
[1]) is the use of two Random Forest classifiers [60]: one trained 
on downtrack gprHOG features, and one trained on cross-track 
gprHOG features.  Both classifiers are trained with 100 trees.   
Threat inference: At each prescreener alarm location, down-
track and cross-track gprHOG features are extracted, 
respectively, at small regular intervals down the time axis.  A 
final decision statistic is computed for each track by summing 
the top 12 classifier decision statistics. The two resulting 
statistics, one from cross-track and one from down-track, are 
multiplied to obtain a final statistic for the alarm. 
D. Spatial edge descriptors (SED) 
The SED algorithm is based upon extracting shape 
information, via gradient histograms, in 2-dimensional GPR 
images.  Unlike most descriptors proposed for GPR-based 
 
Fig. 7: Frequency and spatial responses of the 36 log-Gabor filters for feature 
extraction 
  
 
 
Fig. 8:  Illustration of the extraction of the (a) cross-track gprHOG feature, 
denoted 𝐻𝑡𝑦, and (b) the down-track gprHOG feature, denoted 𝐻𝑡𝑥.  𝐻𝑡𝑦
(𝑖)
 
represents a HOG feature (with no block normalization) extracted on a time-
crosstrack GPR slice located at the 𝑖𝑡ℎ downtrack location within the GPR cube 
provided for feature extraction.  The final cross-track gprHOG feature is given 
by the average of the the HOG features in each slice: 𝐻𝑡𝑦 = (1/𝑁) ∑ 𝐻𝑡𝑦
𝑖
𝑖 .  
Similarly, 𝐻𝑡𝑥
(𝑖)
 represents a HOG feature extracted on a time-downtrack GPR 
slice located at the 𝑖𝑡ℎ cross-track location within the GPR cube, and the final 
down-track feature is given by an average of the individual HOG features.    
  
 BTD, SED operates on spatial imagery: images comprised of 
GPR returns collected at the same instance in time.  In these 
images, referred to as T-scans, buried threat signals appear 
circular rather than hyperbolic.  This is illustrated in Fig. 9.  The 
SED algorithm is designed to capture this shape to provide a 
descriptor of buried threats to the classifier.   
Feature extraction: The SED feature is extracted from a GPR 
volume with (𝑇, 𝑋𝑇, 𝐷𝑇) =  (50,15,15).  The process for 
computing SED is illustrated in Fig. 9.  For the 𝑖𝑡ℎ temporal 
sample in the volume, 𝑡𝑖, we extract an image 𝐼(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑆(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑖).  The image is divided into a 3 × 3 grid of cells.  
In each cell, a histogram of gradients is computed using four 
angle bins, resulting in a 36-dimensional descriptor for the 
image, 𝐻𝑥𝑦
(𝑖)
.  The final descriptor is constructed by averaging 
the descriptors over time, 𝐻𝑥𝑦 = (1/𝑇) ∑ 𝐻𝑥𝑦
𝑖
𝑖 .  The averaging 
step is intended to increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the 
descriptor, due to uncertainty in the temporal location of the 
threat signal, and the tendency of the threat signal to appear over 
many time samples.  
The gradients at each pixel are computed using four 3 × 3 
pixel Sobel filters, each rotated by 45 degrees.  An additional 
bin is added in this step corresponding to “no-edge” if the 
response to all templates is less than a specified threshold.  In 
that case, a count is maintained of the number of pixels in the 
cell whose gradient response was less than the threshold. The 
threshold we use is 3, and this parameter has been relatively 
insensitive to dataset changes.  We note that both using edge 
templates and a “no-edge” bin are similarly implemented in the 
EHD algorithm [32]. 
 
Classifier and training: A Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
[51] with the radial basis function was used for class prediction.  
This was implemented using the libSVM package [52], with 
parameters 𝛾 = 0.001 and SVM cost parameter 𝐶 = 15, which 
were chosen in cross-validation. At each spatial location 
indicated by the prescreener, the time index of the buried threat 
signal is estimated using an energy-based procedure referred to 
as MSEK [38].  The MSEK method computes the signal energy 
along an A-scan (i.e., over the GPR temporal dimension, 
smooths the energy time-series, and then identifies local 
maxima.  For both threat and non-threat data, we extract 
𝑡𝑤𝑜 local maxima for training. 
Threat inference: For threat inference on new data, SED 
features are extracted at regular intervals down the temporal (or 
depth) axis. The temporal locations are obtained, beginning 
with the first temporal index, and then by sampling one location 
every 25 temporal indices.  This results in a total of 14 temporal 
locations.  At each of these locations we extract SED features 
at each spatial location within a 5x5 spatial grid.  This results in 
a total of 350 full SED feature vectors for each prescreener 
alarm.  This extraction can be done very efficiently by reusing 
gradient computations between neighboring SED feature 
vectors.  A final decision statistic for a given prescreener alarm 
location is computed by applying the classifier to all 350 SED 
feature vectors, and then summing the top 25 resulting decision 
statistics.  We have found the performance to be largely 
insensitive to the number of decision statistics in the 
summation.   
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Prescreener results 
The performance results obtained by applying the 
prescreeners to the experimental GPR dataset are presented in 
Fig. 9.  Each prescreener was applied to the same total area of 
lane, but obtained a different total number of false alarms, and 
so their respective ROC curves end at different FAR values.  
The FAR range of the x-axis in Fig. 9 has been extended so it 
includes the maximum FAR value across all of the prescreeners.  
Similarly, each prescreener missed a different total number of 
the true buried threats, and therefore each ROC curve reaches a 
different maximum 𝑃𝑑 value (which is obtained at its 
corresponding maximum FAR value).   
The results in Fig. 9 indicate that CCY substantially 
outperforms F2 at all shared values of FAR.  However, the 
fusion of the two prescreeners (referred to as the “Fusion” 
prescreener in Fig. 9) obtains a much greater 𝑃𝑑 value than 
either F2 or CCY at all shared values of FAR.  The relative 
advantage of CCY over F2 suggests that it is important to 
leverage shape information in threat detection algorithms. CCY 
relies primarily (but not exclusively) on shape-based cues in the 
GPR data, while F2 relies primarily (though not exclusively) on 
signal energy. The large performance improvement yielded by 
their fusion demonstrates that, while a shape-focused approach 
has an overall advantage in our experiments, both energy and 
shape content appear to be important to obtain the best 
performance.  This is implied by the substantial performance 
gain when fusing the two prescreeners.   
Another important finding in Fig. 9 is that the Fusion 
prescreener obtains a greater maximum 𝑃𝑑 than either F2 or 
CCY.  This implies that the F2 prescreener identified some 
threats that were not identified by CCY, further corroborating 
the complementarity of CCY and F2. The discrimination 
algorithms, even if they perform perfectly (𝑃𝑑 = 1 with no false 
alarms) can never identify buried threats that were not already 
identified by the prescreener.  As a result, the maximum 𝑃𝑑 of 
a prescreener can be an important performance criterion, and 
one which is improved via the fusion of CCY and F2.    
 
 
Fig. 9:  Illustration of the process for computing the SED feature.  Around the 
spatial coordinates of the prescreener alarm location and at the time-index 
estimated using MSEK, a 15 × 15 pixel patch is extracted which is divided into 
a 3 × 3 grid of cells.  In each cell, a histogram of gradients is computed using 
4 angle bins.  The final descriptor vector supplied to the classifier is the average 
of computing SED on 50 temporal scans, with the first one computed at 5 
temporal locations above the MSEK temporal location and the last one is 44 
time samples lower. 
  
  
B. Individual discriminator results 
This section presents the results of evaluating the 
discrimination algorithms using lane-based cross-validation 
(Section III.B) on the alarms extracted by the fusion 
prescreener.  The decision statistics of the fusion prescreener 
alarms were thresholded at a pre-determined operating 
sensitivity threshold, yielding 4,372 threat locations (96.1% of 
the total present).  The total number of non-threat locations (i.e., 
false alarms) is omitted to obscure the precise performance 
capabilities of the system.  The cross-validation results for all 
discrimination algorithms that were applied to this dataset are 
presented in Fig. 11.   
The results indicate that no single algorithm consistently 
performs best (i.e., provides the best detection rate, 𝑃𝑑) across 
all of the FAR values.  In the lower FAR range SED performs 
the best, while in the higher FAR range, LG performs best.  
EHD never provides the best 𝑃𝑑 but it provides comparable 
performance to SED and LG over most of the considered FAR 
range.  The gprHOG algorithm briefly performs best at very low 
FAR, but then performs poorly for the remaining FAR range, 
providing lower 𝑃𝑑 than even the prescreener at most FARs.   
It is not surprising that the algorithms obtain (relatively) 
similar performance, due to the similarity in their processing 
strategies. The algorithm designs have gradually converged 
over time through the adoption of practices that have proven to 
be generally effective.  For example, all of the algorithms use 
the two-stage processing pipeline outlined in Fig. 5, comprised 
of feature extraction and classification.  Regarding feature 
extraction, each algorithm extracts features on GPR imagery 
(e.g., slices of the GPR volume) rather than the 3D cubes 
directly.  In addition, all of the features are designed to encode 
shape information in the imagery, especially the hyperbolic 
pattern that is commonly associated with buried threats.  
Finally, all of the features involve aggregating the extracted 
shape information over large spatio-temporal regions of the 
GPR data (aside from gprHOG, which employs relatively 
smaller regions). Within classification, with the exception of 
gprHOG, all of the approaches also use the same classifier: an 
SVM with a radial basis function kernel.   
 
VII. FURTHER ANALYSIS 
A. Fusion experiment 
In this section we attempt to assess the relative 
complementarity of the discrimination algorithms by measuring 
the performance of a simple fusion of their outputs.  Let 𝑡𝑖 be 
the decision statistic of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ discriminator; we use a fusion 
comprised of a simple unweighted multiplication of all four of 
the discriminator decision statistics: 𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∏ 𝑡𝑖
4
𝑖=1  .  Before 
the fusion, we apply the popular Platt scaling [61] to the 
decision statistics of each discriminator. The Platt scaling 
applies a logistic regression (two parameters) to the statistics of 
each discriminator, after which 𝑡𝑖 ∈ [0,1], and the statistics 
approximate a class posterior probability. Unique scaling 
parameters were inferred for each algorithm using the decisions 
statistics generated by cross-validation. In order to minimize 
positive bias in the results, only the statistics from a single lane 
were used for parameter inference (i.e., training), and we note 
that the results were insensitive of the lane chosen for training.   
After this scaling, 𝑡𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 can be interpreted as an “AND” 
operation between the discriminators, in which an object is only 
labeled as a threat if all of the individual discriminators label it 
as a threat.   The results of this fusion are presented in Fig. 12.  
The results indicate that this simple fusion yields a substantial 
improvement in 𝑃𝑑 across all values of FAR.  The substantial 
benefit of fusion, without any subselection or weighting of the 
individual discriminators, suggests that the algorithms possess 
some complementary decision characteristics, despite utilizing 
seemingly similar processing approaches.    
  
 
 
Fig. 10: ROC curves for the two individual prescreeners, F2 and CCY, as well 
as their fusion.  Note that the y-axis has been truncated to the range Pd = [0.5,1].  
 
Fig. 11: ROC curves of all discrimination algorithms computed using in lane-
based cross-validation on the (fusion) prescreener alarms.  Note that the y-axis 
has been truncated to the range Pd = [0.5,1].  
 
  
B. Algorithm performance by burial depth 
In this section we evaluate the performance of the individual 
discrimination algorithms when measuring their performance 
on two disjoint populations of buried threats: threats that are 
buried at standard burial depths, and those with relatively deep 
burial depths. The definition of these categories is described in 
Table 1.  Note that the supervised portions of the algorithms 
were not re-trained in each case; instead we computed ROC 
curves on the subsets of buried threats with the designated 
burial depths.  These results are presented in Fig. 13 (standard 
burial depths) and Fig. 14 (deep burial depths).  
As would be anticipated, the results indicate that the deeply 
buried threats are substantially more difficult to detect than 
those with a more shallow burial depth.  This result is consistent 
with findings in the literature [1], [7], and is likely caused by 
the lower expected signal-to-noise ratio among deeply buried 
threats. It may also be exacerbated by the poor representation 
of deeply buried threats in the training dataset.    
Interestingly however, the LG algorithm offers a substantial 
performance advantage over the other discrimination 
algorithms on deeply buried threats.  This implies that, in 
addition to lower signal-to-noise ratios, deeply buried threats 
may also exhibit different signal characteristics that are 
captured more effectively by the LG features.  One unique 
characteristic of the LG feature is that it encodes shape content 
at multiple scales, which may make it well suited to the smaller 
and/or weaker signals typical of deeply buried threats.  Further 
investigation is needed to confirm this hypothesis however.  
Among threats buried at common depths, the SED algorithm 
performs best over most of the ROC curve, and gains a 
noticeable performance advantage over LG.  EHD also gains 
performance relative to LG in this regard.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that threats may require different 
processing depending upon their burial depth.  This processing 
may not only involve unique features for each burial depth, but 
it may also require resampling the training data.  For example, 
it may be beneficial to replicate deeply buried threats when 
training any supervised classifier for application to that 
population.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS  
In this work we report the results of a recent multi-
institutional effort to develop, and compare, buried threat 
detection algorithms.  The effort involved five institutions with 
an established track record in GPR-based BTD: Duke 
University, University of Louisville, University of Missouri, 
University of Florida, and Chemring Sensors and Electronic 
System (CSES).  A major objective of this effort was to identify 
the best processing approaches, and evaluate them in an 
unbiased manner, for potential inclusion in a real-world BTD 
system.  As a result, each institution was provided with the same 
period of time for algorithm development; the same 
 
Fig. 12: ROC curves of all the individual discrimination algorithms, and their 
fusion via a simple unweighted geometric mean.  Note that the y-axis has been 
truncated to the range Pd = [0.5,1].   
  
 
Fig. 13: ROC curves of all the individual discrimination algorithms when 
applied (but not trained) to threats buried at standard burial depths (i.e., not 
deep).  Note that the y-axis has been truncated to the range Pd = [0.5,1].   
  
 
Fig. 14: ROC curves of all the individual discrimination algorithms when 
applied (but not trained) on threats buried at deep burial depths.  Note that the 
y-axis has not been truncated to the range Pd = [0.5,1].  
 experimental dataset; and advanced knowledge of the 
experimental design, and performance metrics.   
The institutions (excluding CSES) were specifically tasked 
with developing discriminators.  Discriminators must accept a 
small cube of GPR data (e.g., centered at a suspicious spatial 
location), and return a decision statistic, indicating the relative 
likelihood that a buried threat is located at that location.  The 
discriminators produced in this effort were compared using a 
large GPR dataset collected using a vehicle-mounted GPR BTD 
system. The GPR dataset collected using this system, and used 
to compare the discriminators, was comprised of 120,000 m2 of 
surface area, collected over 13 lanes at two different US test 
sites, and encompassing 4,552 buried threat encounters.   
A. Conclusions of the experimental results 
The results reveal similar performance among most of the 
algorithms, with the SED and LG algorithm providing the best 
performance over large subsets of the considered range of false 
alarm rates (FAR).  Further analysis revealed that the LG 
algorithm had a substantial advantage over the other algorithms 
on deeply buried threats, while SED most often outperformed 
other algorithms over buried threats with common burial depths 
(i.e., not deeply buried threats).  A simple fusion of the 
algorithms, involving no sub-selection or weighting of the 
individual algorithms, yielded substantial performance 
improvements.  This result suggests that the algorithms provide 
complementary detection capabilities, despite having many 
similar design characteristics. 
B. Conclusions regarding algorithm design  
In this work we also provided a technical overview of the 
discriminators that were submitted by each institution.  The 
algorithms employed many common designs, which provide 
insight into good design practices for BTD algorithms:  
 Each algorithm employed two-stage processing comprised 
of feature extraction and classification.  
 Each algorithm treats the GPR data like imagery, 
extracting features from slices of the GPR data rather than 
from 3D cubes directly.   
 All of the feature extractors encode some type of shape 
information in GPR imagery, and aggregate this 
information over large spatio-temporal regions.  
 Most of the approaches used an SVM classifier with a 
radial basis function kernel.   
 It may be beneficial to apply different processing strategies 
to deeply buried threats and those at common burial depths 
(see discussion in Section VII.B).   
In addition to these common practices, there were also many 
differences between the algorithms.  Section VII provided 
experimental evidence that there is complementarity in the 
algorithms, and further effective practices may be revealed in 
the future by distilling which unique designs of each algorithm 
give rise to their respective advantages.   
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